In The Matter of the Estate Of Amasa Lyman Clark, Also Known As A. L. Clark : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1970 
In The Matter of the Estate Of Amasa Lyman Clark, Also Known 
As A. L. Clark : Brief of Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Richard L. Bird, J. Duffy Palmer; Attorneys for Respondents 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, In re: A.L Clark, No. 11837 (1970). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4931 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
, OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
AMASA LYMAN CLARK, also 
known as A. L. CLARK, 
Deceased, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
' Appeal from a Judgment of the District Comt of Davis CCMllltr 
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, J'adp 





Lake City, Utah 84111 
s for Objectors and 
ts 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
RICHARDS & WATKINS 
720 Newhouse Buildiq 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8'111 
Attorneys for Dale D. Clark, 
Respondent · 
J. Duffy Palmer 
HESS, PALMER & 
VANWAGENEN 
40 South 125 East 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Attorneys Estate of 
Amasa Lyman Clark and 
Respondent 
FILED 
JAN5 - 1970 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STA'fE,)IENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------·· l 
POINTS OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 2 
ARG N 'f _________________________ ----------------------------------- 3 
Point ti-Points I and 2 were not properly be-
fore the District Court -------------------------------------------- 3 
Point I-Utah's non-claim statute is not ap-
plieable to this proceeding. ------------------------------------ 4 
Point 2-The issue of specific performance was 
properly before the District Court. ---------------------- 12 
. Point 3-The agreement for sale of stock is not 
illusory and is not an option, but a binding agree-
ment. __________________________________________________________ ------------ __ _ _ 14 
Point 4<-The agreement for sale of stock does 
not constitute a gift. ----------------------------------·------------- 19 
Point 5-The agreement for sale of stock is 
not a testamentary disposition. -------------------·------------ 19 





Blake v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 158, 179 Pac. 737 ......... 
R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Child, 22 Utah 194 
247 P.2d 817 ( 1952) -----------------------------··············'.ii 
Fonda v. Miller ( 1951), 411 Ill. 74, 103 NE 2d 98 ii 
Frawley v. Forrest, 310 :Mass. 446, 38 NE 2 631 .. i:J 
Free v. Little, 31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407 (1907) .... i: 
Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 U 421, 64 P. 948 ............... 1: 
Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 
258 Pac. 342 ( 1927) ------·-------------····--··-··········· j 
In re Agees Estate, 69 Utah 130, 252 Pac. 891 
( 1927) -----------------------------------------------------------·--······ j 
In re Anjewierdens Estate, 13 Utah 2d 378, 
37 4 p .2d 845 ( 1962) -------------------------------·--·-········ j
In re Lewis Estate, 2 Wash. 2d 458, 98 P .2d 654 .. 5, rn 
In re Neff's Estate, 8 Utah 2d 368 335 P.2d 403 
( 1959) ----------------------------------------------------------·----····· j 
James v. Corvin, 184 Wash. 356, 51 P.2d 689 ......... i 
Kimbler's Administrator v. Sanford, 310 Ky. 66, 
221 SW 2d 638 -------------------------------------------·-······· 21' 
Lawrence Block Co., Inc. v. Palston, 123 CA 2d · 
300, 266 P.2d 856 --------------------------------------·---········Iii 
Lieber v. Sherman, 130 Colo. 216, 274 P.2d 816 .... 5 
Lundy v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 162, 179 Pac. 728 ········ 5 
Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d, 433 -----------------·---······· JJ 
l\!IcHenry v. l\!IcHenry, 158 Ga. 105, 108 SE 522 ···· 21 
11 
Page 
:\Iealtis v. K rue ken berg, 171 Kansas 450, 233 P.2d 
472, 31 ALR 2d 525 ------------------------·-··--·············· 21
}litchell Novelty Co. v. United Mfg., 94 F. Supp. 
412 --------------------···---··-··--·-····--·-···························-··· 18 
Xellev v. First National Bank, 135 Ore. 409, 293 ' r. 121 --··-·······---···--····----·--·-····--······················-······ 21 
Patellis v. Tanner ( 1944), 197 Ga. 471, 29 SE 
419 .................. -·---·-·····-··--·-···········----···················· 21 
Rogers v. Nichols, 75 Utah 290, 284 Pac. 992 
( 1930) ···-····--····-·-···--····--·--··················-··········-·····-· 13 
Shackelton v. Sefree, 86 Ill. 616 -----·-·-----------···-········· 22 
Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 
729, 418 P.2d 187 ( 1966) -------···--··-··-·-·-··-·······--·-17 
White v. 'Vester, 170 Ok. 250, 39 P.2d 32 ---·-·-···-· 21 
Wilson v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho 515, 34 P.2d 409 ____ 9 
:\IISCELLANEOUS AND TEXTS 
31 ALR 2d 538 ··------·-··-·-------------------------····----·--·· 20, 21 
3± ALR 362 --------------·--····-----------····----·--····················· 8 
41 ALR 144 ·----------------·--·--------------·-····---·--··--············· 5, 6 
!7 ALR 896 -------------------------------------------····--·····---···-·-· 5 
17 Am. J ur., Contracts, Sec. 5 -------------------------···-------· 14 
31 Am. J ur. 2d, Executors and Administrators, 
Sec. 276, p. 143; Sec. 318, p. 158 ----·-···--···-·-··· 6, 7 
Hanard Law Review When are Deeds Testa-
mentary, Vol. 18, p. 470 ····----····-·······--··-·-·---·--··---· 21 
111 
Paif 
Page on Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision), Sec. 6.7, 
P. 261 ---------------------------------------------------·-···-··········· 
Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 12 ------------------ ......... 1J 
Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.), Sec. 13 ........... 11 
Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.), Sec. 61A ........ Ji 
STATUTES 
Sec. 75-9-1, UCA 1953 --------------------------------------....... 11 
Sec. 75-9-4, UCA 1953 ------------------------------------------······ ; 
Sec. 75-10-8, UCA 1953 ---------------------------------------······ J:: 
Sec. 75-11-26, UCA 1953 ------------------------------------·· 13,Zi 
Sec. 75-11-27, UCA 1953 -----------------------------------·--· .. 1: 
IV 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
AMASA L Yl\IAN CLARK, also 
known as A. L. CLARK, 
Deceased, 
( Case No. 
11626 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent takes mild exception to some of the 
statements made by appellant in its statement of facts. 
There is no evidence to support the following recitals 
on page 2 of appellant's brief: 
"* * * had been a resident of Davis County 
for many years and an outstanding citizen of 
the community. He was one of the founders of 
the Davis County Bank and had during his life-
time owned considerable stock in the bank. * * * 
at the age of 103 years and a resident of Davis 
County, State of Utah." 
1 
In the same paragraph the statement is made: 
"_Mr. Bird, the attorney for Dale D. Clal 
prepared this agreement (Tr. 36) ." 1 ' 
which statement is repeated at page 6 of the appellant, 
brief. The testimony as to the document was at Tr. 3o: 
"This is one of the drafts prepared by my attornev. 
There was no testimony as to what other drafts w;re 
prepared or how the particular one evolved. 
At page 5 of appellant's brief is a statement that 
after a colloquy about who should go forward with proof 
the respondent "then" put in a copy of the agreement a1 
an exhibit. The record discloses that Exhibit "A" wa1 
offered by the attorney for the Estate (Tr. 3) and thal 
the Estate also offered Exhibit "B" (Tr. 4, 24) and thai 
respondent simply substituted the original of Exhibit 
"A" for the copy offered by the Estate. (Tr. 3, 4) 
Point 5 contains a premise of facts which are not 
in evidence. 
Appellant raises five points in his brief which re· 
spondent will state affirmatively from the standpoint 
of the decision and argue in this brief. Respondent also 
raises a sixth point, which will be argued first, cha!· 
lenging appellant's points I and 2 as having been not 
timely raised. 
POINTS OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
I. Utah's non-claim statute is not applicable 10 
this proceeding. 
2 
z. The issue of specific performance was properly 
before the District Court. 
8. The agreement for sale of stock is not illusory 
and is not an option, but a binding agreement . 
.J<. The agreement for sale of stock does not con-
1t[tute a gift. 
5. The agreement for sale of stock is not a testa-
mentary disposition. 




POINTS 1 AND 2 \VERE NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The case came on for trial on May 9, 1969 on the 
issues raised by the original Petition for Confirmation 
uf Salt' (R-1,2), the "Objection" (R-4), the "Answer 
to Objection" (R-6), the "Amended Objection" (R-8, 
filed April 15, 1969) and the ruling of Judge Swan on 
April 22, 1969 ( R-18, p. 5: "the Court could make an 
order at this time that this is a proceeding to authorize 
the executor to perform a contract entered into by the 
deceased during his lifetime.") The Order is supplied 
;,, a secolld supplement to the record and make the issue 
of specific performance plain. 
3 
On May 9 the Executor offered in evidence llie 
agreement (Tr. 3) and then the appellants moved 1, 
dismiss the proceeding because "no petition for any de-
termination" had been filed by the respondent and aho 
because "no claim has been filed with the estate" (Tr. 
8, lines 17 and 22). 
Respondent objected to both issues as not timelr 
raised and not raised by the executor, whose right it 
was to object (Tr. 11). 
Judge Swan had fixed the issues for trial as beina 
' for specific performance over the objections in para· 
graphs (a) to ( e) of the Amended Objections, para-
graph (f) being stricken (R-18, p. 5, lines 26 to 29ol 
the record of April 22 hearings) . See Finding of Fart 
4, Conclusions of Law 5 and 6 (R-11 and 12). 
Failure to file a claim could of course be raised al 
the trial if jurisdictional. 
POINT 1 
UTAH'S NON-CLAIM STATUTE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THIS PROCEEDING. 
Respondents admit that where there are no special 
circumstances and no facts taking the case out of 75·9·1 
UCA 1953, the Utah cases hold that certain claims 
must be presented within the time provided. The Utan 
cases cited hold nothing more and involve no facts analo· 
A · · dell' gous to the facts of this case. In Re nJewzer · 
Estate, 13 Utah 2d 378, 374, Pacific 2d 84.5, it was helu 
4 
that mailing to the wrong address was not a sufficient 
filing and did not excuse filing; In Re Neff' s Estate, 
8 Gtah 2d 368, 335 P .2d 403, stands for the proposition 
that the pendency of an action at the time of death of 
one of the parties is not a substitute for filing a claim 
ill the estate; In Ile A gees Estates, 69 Utah 130, 252 
P. 8Ul, it is held that an attorney has a lien against the 
product of litigation conducted by him, and that even 
though the funds are in the hands of the executor, the 
lien applies and his action therefore is not barred by the 
prorisious of the non-claim statute; in Halloran-Judge 
1'rust Co. vs. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342, it is 
held that a contract to manage a building for ten years, 
during which ten year period the owner died, had to be 
filerl as a contingent claim and was barred under the 
statute for non-filing. 
The appellants also cite cases from Colorado, Wash-
ington and Idaho, and refer to annotations in 41 ALR 
lH and 47 ALR 896. Lieber vs. Sherman, (Colorado 
1954) 274 P.2d 816 simply holds that a lessor's claim 
for rent was not an expense of administration and there-
fore required the filing of a claim; James vs. Corvin 
(Washington 1935) 51 P .2d 689 simply holds that a 
lessor must file a claim for rent not yet due against the 
estate of a lessee. In Lundy vs. Lemp, (Idaho 1919) 
179 P. 738, there was a contract to convey land which 
had been partially paid when the grantor died. No 
daim was filed and the court held that no action could 
be maintained, the statute there requiring filing of "any 
5 
claim against an estate." The statute is so broad as to 
be no precedent in this case. 
In 41 ALR 144 where objectors say the cases ar 
" 11 d" h · e co ecte t ere are no cases m point. 
Respondents submit that with the death of AL. 
Clark the rights reserved to A. L. Clark ceased and the· 
stock belonged to Dale D. Clark, subject only to pay 
ment of money. · 
It must be borne in mind that the executor here 11 
making no objection to the delivery of the stock upon 
payment of the funds (Tr. 18, lines 17 to 29, also Tr. 
p. 2), and no issue as to filing a claim was raised o1· 
the estate or by the objectors by their objections or pre-
served in the order of Judge Swan. 
Respondent's position is that the executor is pre-
pared to perform and has constantly indicated to re-
spondent that it will perform and that the right of re· 
spondent to the stock is not a claim required to be filell 
(Tr. 12, lines 27 to 30; See also testimony of respondent, 
Tr. 29 to 32). 
This position has general support. In 31 Am. Jur 
2d Title "Executors and Administrators" at Section 216 
on page 143 this statement si made: 
"Presentation of a claim or demand has been 
held unnecessary in actions to quiet real 
or personal property, actions for spec1f1c pehr· 
formance of a contract to convey, actions for I e 
recovery of a specific property * * *" 
6 
At Section 318 on page 158: 
"Thus, it is not only within the power of an 
executor or administrator to complete a contract 
made by his decedent, it is his duty to carry out 
the contract. If he fails to perform a contract 
of his decedent which is binding on the estate, 
he may be compelled to pay damages out of the 
assets in his hands." 
It is the position of respondent and evidently the 
position of the executor and the District Court that 
Dale Clark, having given valuable consideration to 
A. L. Clark, which was received and acknowledged by 
A. L. Clark, has purchased the bank stock, and has such 
an interest that the estate does not have clear title and 
the claim of Dale Clark is in the nature of an action for 
specific performance, to declare a lien, or to compel de-
livery of the property. (Decree of Specific Perform-
ance R-13-14). 
The non-claim statute (U.C.A. 75-9-4) concludes: 
"Provided further, that nothing in this title 
contained shall be so construed as to prohibit the 
foreclosure of liens or mortgages as hereinafter 
provided." 
Section 75-9-11, after requiring that an action shall not 
be maintained unless a claim is first filed then says: 
"Except that an action may be brought with-
out notice by any holder of a mortgage or lien to 
enforce the same against the property of the es-
tate subject thereto, where all recourse against 
any other property of the estate is expressly 
waived in the complaint * * *" 
7 
Thus it appears that an action for specific perfonu. 
ance or to compel delivery of personal property is not , 
treated at all under the claim section of the statute b, u, ' 
appears in Chapter 11 of Title 75, Section 26 of whitli 
provides that where a person dies being 
"bound by contract in writing to assign, trans-
fer or deliver any personal property, shares or 
capital stock, bonds or other choses in action 
and where the decedent if living "might be curu· 
pelled to make such conveyance, assignment 
transfer or deliver such personal property, share! 
of capital stock, bonds or other choses in action. · 
to the person entitled thereto." 
Under a similar statute the Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that the correct procedure is not by filing a 
claim but by application to the probate court for a de-
cree. Blake vs. Lemp, 32 Idaho 158, 179 Pac. 737. 
The subject of presentation of claims before bring· 
ing action is annotated at 34 A.L.R. 362, in which it ti 
said at page 383 as the general rule: 
"It has been held that a statute requiring pre · 
sentation of a claim does not apply where thr : 
claim is one for the recovery of specific property. 
to which a number of cases are cited. And at page 38i 
it is stated also that a suit to compel specific performance 
does not require the filing of a claim as a prerequisite. 
It was also held by the District Court that the bant 
stock belongs to Dale Clark as a matter of agreement 
on March 22, 1968, which was a present contract trans 
8 
ferring the stock to Dale, but reserving the right of A. 
L. Clark to use it and to hold title until his death and 
precluding him from making any use of the stock in-
consistent with the sale to Dale, or of delivering any of 
the stock to any other person or agreeing so to do. The 
is now in a position where it must dispose of the 
bank stock and it is precluded by the contract of A. L. 
Clark from disposing of it to any person other than 
Dale D. Clark. If A. L. Clark were living and desired 
lo dispose of the stock he could be compelled by Dale 
!J. Clark to deliver the stock to him and to no other 
person in exchange for which the payment would be 
made. 
To support the proposition that A. L. Clark during 
his lifetime was not required to do anything under this 
agreement, the objectors at page 7 include the following 
citations: 
"In Wilson v. Fackrell, 34 P. 2d 409 (Idaho 
1934), the Court held that 'in order for appellant 
to be entitled to relief sought the proof must 
show the decedent was bound, by contract in 
writing, to convey . . . and that it was such a 
contract that he, if living might be compelled to 
make the conveyance.' 34 Pac. 2d at 411. See 
also In re Lewis Estate, 98 P .2d 654 (Wash. 
1940) ." 
These two cases have no support for the appellants 
but rather support the position of respondent. The lan-
guage quoted in appellants' Brief at page 16 is indeed 
language founrl. in the opinion in Wilson vs. Fackrell, 
9 
but it is simply a paraphrase of the statute in Idak 
which is Section 15-1001 and is similar to the Ltai. 
statute, except that the Idaho statute is limited to real 
estate. The facts in Wilson were that one :Fackrell prl· 
pared a contract of sale to his sister, Annie F. Wilson. 
calling for sale of property for $2,000.00, endorsed uu 
the back of it a receipt for $2,000.00 and put both inai1 • 
envelope which he handed to the "grantee." The sister 
did not read the contract, did not sign it, and did 110: 
know what it contained until after the death of Fatk· 
rell. The District Court, upon trial as a Probate Court 
refused specific performance, holding that \\Tilson hac 
shown only an executory contract and not an enforce-
able contract. The Supreme Court held that there wa1 
a completed gift inter vivos and therefore an execute1\ 
contract which was enforceable and indicated by lht 
opinion and by the authorities cited therein that it 11 
the obligation of the Court to carry out the indicatrc 
intention of the deceased if possible and ordered a nf11 
trial on that theory. 
In re Lewis Estate likewise is a holding that the 
intention of the deceased shall be carried out. Thert 
the owners of property made a conveyance and took a 
mortgage back providing for payment by installmenb 
with the provision that if any sum remained due ani! 
owing upon the death of the grantor-mortgagee th'. 
note and mortgage should be declared null and yoid 
The issue arose in the Probate Court on whether thi 






tor who was also the "mortgagor." The executor had 
cancelled the mortgage with approval of the Court, and 
then upon objections of creditors the Court had re-
ierse<l itself and ordered the mortgage reinstated and 
paid. From this an appeal was taken and the Supreme 
Court again reversed and held that the mortgage was 
properly cancelled and that the provision of the contract 
that the balance should be cancelled as to any amount 
remaining upon the death of grantor was an enforce-
able proYision. The Court carefully reviews other cases, 
riewing the problem as an unusual one. The Court 
concludes: 
"In this case it is clear from the initial agree-
ment and all the subsequent instruments that 
the dominant purpose of the decedent was to 
enter into a contract for the sale of his property 
on definitely expressed terms. There was con-
sideration for the contract, and mutual perform-
ance by the parties. 'Ve see no reason why per-
sons should not enter into such an undertaking 
nor any reason why the Court should interfere 
with their expressed intention, in the absence of 
any fraud * * *. Had the note and mortgage 
been fully paid before death, satisfaction of rec-
ord could have been compelled by the party en-
titled thereto under the contract. Since the de-
cedent's death marked the termination of the 
obligation under the contract, the appellant was 
entitled to the same relief." (Page 658 of 98 
P.2d). 
It is uot a prerequisite to stating a claim for specific 
Ptrformanee against an estate to allege that the peti-
11 
tioner filed a claim before filing the petition or before 
bringing an action for a specific performance. 
I 
! 
In Gammon vs. Bunnell, 22 U 421, 64 P. 948, the ! 
case was heard on the demurrer to the complaint. Tfie ! 
District Court held and the Supreme Court affirmed ' 
that a cause of action was stated in a complaint for 3 
specific performance which alleged the filing of a pPtj. 
tion in the Probate Court and the dismissal there with-
out prejudice and the essential elements of the claim • 
for specific performance on the merits. There was no i 
allegation of filing a claim with the exceutor or in the : 
estate. Likewise, in Free vs. Little, 31 U 449, 88 P 
407, the Court ruled that a specific performance action 
was not maintainable where there had not first 
petition filed with the Probate Court and denied there 
without prejudice, with no statement as to a require· 
ment of first filing a claim in the Probate Court. 
POINT 2 
THE ISSUE OF SPECIFIC PERFORM·• 
ANCE 'VAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE DIS· 
TRICT COURT. 
Respondent's Point 6 urges that this issue was no! 
timely raised, as the District Court held. 
The Executor here filed a verified petition in suo· 
stantial compliance wiht Section 75-11-27 U.C.A. 195,1.' 
The District Court, with all parties represented, 011 
12 
April 22, 1969, ordered the case to trial on the issue of 
specific performance (Supplement record). 
The appellants' Brief in its Point II chooses to call 
this "a jurisdictional prerequisite." The only case cited 
which is helpful on this subject is Rogers vs. Nichols, 
i5 Utah 290, 284 P. 992. But that case was far from 
the facts of this one. There an objection was made to 
the final account of the executor in which it was sug-
gested that title should be quieted to part of the property 
and the Court granted specific performance to a con-
iract without any request therefor in any pleading. 
There is no statement that no objection was made to 
this conduct of the Court and nothing there is precedent 
for the situation here where there have been pleadings 
filed by the parties and merged in an order of the Court 
ll'hich specifically states that the matter to be deter-
mined on the trial is "that this matter is to be considered 
iJ). the parties and by the Court as a proceeding for the 
specific performance of a contract of the Decedent and 
is not a confirmation of a sale by the Executor under 
the prorisions of 75-10-8, U.C.A. 1953." It thus appears 
that with the acquiescence of the parties and after the 
filing of pleadings the Court has made a determination 
that the proceeding is under Section 75-11-26 and no 
objection was made to that by any pleading or notice. 
Furthermore, no time limit is dictated in Section 
7.3-11-27 and if the Court regards the objection as timely 
and as important, the petition can now be filed. The 
ExPcutor has in effect waved the requirement of the 
13 
petition by itself filing a verified petition seekinig au. 
thority to deliver the property. 
POINT 3 
THE AGREEl\IENT FOR SALE OF 
STOCK IS NOT ILLUSORY AND IS NOT AN 
OPTION, BUT A BINDING AGREEMENT. 
The contract between A. L. Clark and his sou ' 
I 
Dale D. Clark, executed March 22, 1968 is classifieJ 
as a "bilateral" contract, which is defined as one in· 
valving promises on the part of both parties thereto. 
17 Am. J ur. 2d, Contracts Section 5, p. 339 - Restalt· 
ment of Contracts, Section 12, Williston on Contracts, 
ad ed., Sec. 13. 
It is said in Manwill vs. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d, 433, 
that in order to have a valid and binding contract, each 
party must be bound to give some legal consideration 
to the other by confering a benefit upon him or suffer· 
ing a legal detriment at his request. 
In this case each party gave to the other valuable 
and binding consideration. 
A. L. Clark received first what he requested ol 
respondent, i.e. an agreed settlement of a lawsuit be· 
tween Dale and one Howard S. Clark. Secondly, he 
sold to Dale Clark 530 shares of stock of the DaYil I 
County Bank for $60.00 per share reserving the right 
to vote, control and own said stock for his lifetime or 
14 
until he should be paid in full for said stocks following 
tender and demand by him for payment. 
To analyze this last consideration, A. L. Clark had 
the right to hold said stock during his lifetime and by 
the promises of respondent he could demand $60.00 a 
share irrespective of whether the market value of said 
stock fell below or rose above $60.00. This was the right 
.\. L. Clark bargained for and respondent gave at the 
time the contract was signed by both parties. 
Without question, A. L. Clark sold this stock to 
Dale D. Clark, reserving only for his lifetime a right 
to rote the stock and control same. At his death his 
reservation ended in accordance with the plain contract 
language and then the stock upon payment of $31,800.00 
1rould be delivered absolutely to respondent. 
Dnle D. Clark by signing the contract was bound 
to pay $31,800.00 for ,530 shares of stock of the Davis 
County llank. He thereby assumed a market risk. If 
the stock fell in value he would suffer disappointment, 
ur if the stock increased in value he would realize a 
bargain. He was bound to pay for the stock when his 
father demanded payment or at his fa th er' s death if no 
demand had been made. He also gave up his position 
in the adion against Howard S. Clark as bargained for 
by his father. This was the essence of the contract. 
'I I. This contract cannot be properly classified as an 
option. Willislun on Contracts, 3d ed., Sec. 61A, thus 
defines nn option: "A contract to keep an offer open," 
15 
and as involving an offer "which the offeror may not 
withdraw until the expiration of the time fixed for !n, 
reason that the promise is based on a consideration 
And again, "The crux of the matter is the open di.i. 
cretion of the optionee to take or to leave the proposal 
"The obligation by which one binds himself to sell anil 
leaves it discretionary with the other party to huy.'' 
Thus it is plain that the respondent had no op!iou 
but was absolutely committed to pay the price when <le. 
mantled or when A. L. Clark died. The seller did not 
make an offer, which was kept open, but entered in!o 
a binding agreement based on separate and indepenJ. 
ent consideration and had on discretion as to who 11·a1 
the owner of his stock but only as to the time when ht 
would require payment which would automatically ne 
required at his death if he chose to enjoy his 
rights to the end. 
The Agreement is Not Illusory. 
In this case both parties were bound from the time 
the contract was signed by the terms thereof, inasmuco 
as the contract was given for mutual promises. Thu) 
from the time the contract was signed it was a com· 
pleted contract in that both parties were bound by all 
the provisions thereof. It was executory only in part. 
Respondent did not have the right to decide whether or 
not he should purchase the stock. He had purchascJ 
the stock with the reservation retained by his father. 
The contract reads "A. L. Clark is the owner of j 211 
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shares * * * which he agrees is sold to Dale D. Clark." 
His father was bound by the contract having received 
ialuable consideration therefor, and it was only by the 
reservation of the lifetime rights that he held control 
uf the stock during his lifetime. After his death this 
reservation ended by the terms of the contract and the 
rnntract gave full rights in the stock to Dale. In other 
words. he conveyed a present right in the stock subject 
to 11 life estate. (Conclusions of Law, 2 and 3, R-12). 
At pages 17 and 18 the appellants cite four cases 
to their argument that the agreement is illusory because 
1t permits performance "only when it pleases" A. L. 
Clark. On the contrary, A. L. Clark was bound by the 
sale of stock to Dale Clark reserving the right to exer-
cise the indicia of ownership only so long as he lived and 
at his age the period from the date of agreement to the 
11ncertai11 date of death was a reasonable period of time. 
Death would certainly come and at death the reserved 
rights would terminate and the only thing that left a 
r·hoice to A. L. Clark was whether he would choose to 
demand payment before death. 
And in the meantime, A. L. Clark received the 
consideration for which he bargained, viz., settlement 
11f the intra-family lawsuit. 
As to appellants' four cases: Tatsch vs. Hamilton-
Ericksun Manufacturing Company, 76 NM 729, 418 
P.2d .J.87 says, as to the point here at page 190: 
"The fact that an acceptance was to become 
effeetiYe only upon the happening of a condition 
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does not prevent a binding contract from com' 
. ff h h . lliu e ect upon t e al?penmg _of that conditiu: 
if was the mamfested mtention of th 
parties. 
And, of course, that was not the manifested intenfo 
of A. L. Clark and Dale Clark who made a bindiu
11 
contract on the spot with time of delivery of stock an: 
payment of money postponed until demand by A. L 
Clark or his death, whichever would be sooner. Tnr 
same language is used by the Utah Supreme Court w 
R. J. Daurn Construction Cornpany vs. Child, 247 P.ia 
817 at 820. The Court there observed that there wai 
clearly no binding contract intended "unless and unW 
the government awarded to appellant the general con· 
tract." which does not apply to the instant case becam1 
there was a binding contract both as to the stock anu 
as to the lawsuit. In Lawrence Block Company Ii, 
Palston, 266 P.2d 856 the Court found no binding con 
tract because the offeree made a conditional acceplanu 
under which he would be bound only if he approreJ 
OPA rent statements and subject to his inspection ana 
approval of all apartments, with no standards for eithe: 
approval. The Court concluded that this "was not at 1 
offer to enter into an agreement, but an offer to enter 
into an agreement if he later wished to do so. Tni1 
illusory promise is the only off er that was submitted bi· 
plaintiff to defendant" which is again readily distill 
guishable from the case at bar. And finally, J°l'JiflM! 
Novelty Cornpany vs. United Manufacturing, DJ Fen, 
Supp. 412 involves a contract with "a reasonable royal!! 
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to be fixed later" which the Court found unenforceable 
for uncertainty. 
POINT 4 
THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
STOCK DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A GIFT. 
Appellants at page 21 argue from facts which are 
uot in evidence. There is no evidence that the value 
of the stock was greater than the sum that Dale Clark 
agreed to pay and there is no evidence that there was 
a gift of any kind involved in the agreement before 
the Court. The settlement of the lawsuit was bargained 
for on the face of the agreement, as well as by the pre-
cautionary acknowledgment stated on the back of 
Exhibit B. 
Respondent has at no time suggested that there 
was a gift or has ever argued the principle of a gift 
causa mortis as a substitute for delivery to a donee. 
POINT 5 
THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
STOCK IS NOT A TESTAMENTARY DIS-
POSITION. 
The contract states that A. L. Clark agrees that 
the 530 shares of the capital stock of the Davis County 
Bauk are sold to Dale Clark. Upon signing the con-
traet he was not free to sell the stock to a third person 
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or to bequeath it to anyone else. His control of tfit 
stock was to exist only during his lifetime and en<leJ 




gated upon demand or at his father's death to pay fo, 
the stock in cash and then obtain full indicia of owner. 
ship and possession of the stock. There was no question 
as to whether the stock was sold, and no option or rt· 
served right in A. L. Clark to determine whether 111 
not Dale would get the stock. His only right was t1J 
determine when he would require payment, the amouul 
of which was fixed by the contract. 
This is not a situation where there was an open 
offer of A. L. Clark awaiting acceptance. The bargaii 
of the parties was for consideration which was exchangeu 
and the stock was sold but Dale agreed that certai11 
rights as to the stock could be exercised until he paio 
in full for it. 
Page on TV ills (Bowe-Parker Revision) , Sectio11 
6.7, page 261, states this rule: 
"If an instrument creates a right in the pro· 
misee before the death of promisor, the inslru· 
ment is a contract regardless of the date set for 
performance." 
A similar situation is with deeds containing provision' 
limiting or postponing the grantee's rights until the 
grantor's death. These are uniformly held to passa 
h d · mereil' present interest to t e grantee an postponmg · 
his enjoyment thereof, subject to enjoyment of tni 
grantor during his life. See annotation at 31 A.LR 
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zd, 53s, Section 5; Kimbler's Administrator vs. San-
ford, 310 Ky. 66, 221 SW 2d 638; White vs. Wester, 
'170 ok. 250, 39 P.2d 32; Patellis vs. Tanner, (1944) 
197 Ga. 471, 29 SE 2d 419; Fonda vs. Miller, (1951) 
JJl Ill. 74, 103 NE 2d 98; Mealtis vs. Kruckenberg, 
l71 Kansas 450 233 Pac. 2d 472, 31 A.L.R. 2d 525. 
In Nelley vs. First National Bank, 135 Ore. 409, 
293 P. 721, a deed granted and conveyed personal 
property which was construed as conveying a remainder 
interest to the grantee. The provision in the deed that 
the conveyance should not go into effect until after 
grantor's death did not preclude the Court from hold-
ing that a present interest was created in the grantee. 
McHenry vs. McHenry, 158 Ga. 105, 108 SE 522, 
inrnlved an instrument which purported to give, grant 
and convey certain shares of corporate stock to others, 
hut reserved in maker the right to receive and use divi-
dends declared thereon during his lifetime. The Court 
said the reservation of the right to use the dividends 
during grantor's life was inconsistent with the idea that 
the instrument was testamentary in character. 
An article in the :Michigan Law Review, Volume 
18, page 470, entitled "When are Deeds Testamentary" 
by Henry H. Ballantine a law professor in the Illinois 
Unirersity, says that in the majority of states the lan-
guage that the deed is "to be in force and effect from 
and after the decease of grantor" is interpreted very 
l'b 1 eral!y. Such language, he states, may be regarded 
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as representing a confusion of two events (I) the in 
tent to give an estate to commence in futuro, but IJ, 
reserve the possession, use and enjoyment of the pro., 
erty during grantor's lifetime, and ( 2) the intent; , 
,1.1, 
make a present dispositive instrument, but to keep 
deed ambulatory like a will during grantor's lifetiint 
The probable intention is effectuated by holding th 
instrument operative in praesenti as a grant of a future 
estate. 
Shackelton vs. Sefree, 86 Ill. 616 is relied upon 
partly by the professor. In commenting on that cast. 
the professor said 
"In view of the act of delivery to the grantee 
in the lifetime of grantor and the intention toot 
gathered from the whole transaction the prori· 
sion 'that title shall not pass until death' does not 
mean that grantee shall acquire no right or li1· 
terest under the deed until grantor's death. Tilt 
deed conveys a vested interest to commence in 
futuro and necessarily cuts down the estate re 
maining in grantor." 
So here, the agreement transferring the right was de· 
livered to respondent passing present rights. 
Another article is found in the Harvard Law Re 
view, Volume 30, in a note on page 508. The facts art 
as follows: 
A signs, seals, records and delivers to B an 
ment drawn in the form of a warranty deed 1 
, I 
Blackacre to B, and his heirs. Consideration reciteu 
in deed. In the habendum clause is inserted "this deco 
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isto take effect upon the death of grantor." The great 
wajority of cases seem to take an intermediate position. 
They hold the instrument to be a valid deed which ap-
parently vests the fee in B at once, with the enjoyment 
thereof postponed until A's death, with more or less 
i:iguely defined "life estate" reserved "by implication" 
or by operation of law in A. If the clause had read "The 
estate to vest" instead of "deed to take effect" it would 
seem impossible in the author's view to have questioned 
its validity. In Note 4 of this article, many cases are 
cited as supporting the majority view. 
In Frawley vs. Forrest, 310 Mass. 446; 38 NE 2 
li81, 138 ALR 999, the deed reserved to the grantor and 
her husband a life estate during the lifetime of either 
or both of them. This reservation operated to give the 
grantor a life estate and by operation of law to give a 
remainder in the plaintiff who was a grantee. This re-
mainder was an immediate interest. 
SUMMARY 
Respondent submits that the attack on the formal 
insufficiency of the petition for right of specific per-
formance is not timely, having been acquiesced in by 
the parties and made plain by the order of Judge Swan 
11f April 28. 
Respondent takes the position that the necessity for 
tiling a daim is also not properly before the Court as 
nut timely raised; but more importantly, this proceeding 
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is not governed by Section 75-9-1, but by Section .. /,) 
11-26, UCA 1953. 
The agreement between the respondent and · 
father was a binding bilateral contract by which a pn 
sent interest was transferred to the respondent for· 
promised price and by which the deceased had 
benefit for which he bargained, namely settlement 0 
the family litigation. 
The intentions of the parties to the contract wt 
clear and unambiguous; the executor of the estate 
prepared to go forward and raises no objection to ]lt! 
f ormance of the contract as ordered by the Dis · 
Court. 
The order of the District Court should be affirm 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR 
Of Richards & 'Vatkins 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll 
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